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Do changes in the law influence the mortgage market and loan characteristics?
The intuitive answer might be yes, but there is little evidence of how mortgage
law affects mortgage price and leverage. If the law imposes higher costs or risks
for lenders, it is fair to assume that lenders may transfer the costs to the borrower
or demand higher loan collateralization. Moreover, not all aspects of mortgage
law induce the same effects. While some aspects may change the borrower’s
probability of default, others may only lead to higher recovery costs or longer
recovery processes. When deciding to change or not to change the law it is, thus,
important to have a reasonable knowledge of its different impacts. Many authors, at
least since Pence (2006), have analyzed the influence of the law on mortgage credit,
but few approach other outcomes besides loan amounts. This paper addresses this
gap in the literature. By using loan-level data for the U.S. mortgage market, I trace
how two aspects of the law—foreclosure procedure and deficiency judgments—
influence the mortgage interest rate and the loan-to-value ratio at origination.
Similar to the extensive empirical literature (see, for example, Ghent and
Kudlyak (2011), Mian et al. (2015), and Milonas (2017)), I start by taking
advantage of mortgage law heterogeneity across states in the United States. I
classify each state according to two aspects of the law: foreclosure procedure and
deficiency judgments. On the one hand, the law might require a court’s approval
to initiate the foreclosure, which delays the process and makes it more costly. In
these cases, I classify states as judicial. On the other hand, the law might not allow
for deficiency judgments, which is usually known as a situation of non-recourse. It
means that, if the house sale price is lower than the debt value, the lender cannot
seize other assets or income of the borrower to recover the debt. Besides limiting
the recovery opportunities, it might also affect the borrower’s probability of default
by encouraging strategic defaults. In these cases, I classify states as non-recourse.
One critical concern regarding mortgage heterogeneity is the verification of
the desirable orthogonality properties along with state-level economic and social
conditions. To address this issue, I check if states with distinct law classifications
vary among other attributes that might influence the determination of the mortgage
interest rate or the loan-to-value ratio at origination such as, for example,
demographic factors. After inspecting the period from 2000 to 2016, I conclude
that the orthogonality condition is not valid from 2012 onward. By combining this
result with the loan-level data availability, I restrict the study to the period between
2001 and 2011.
I continue by developing a simple theory of mortgage origination to provide
guidance on the impact of mortgage law on loan characteristics. The motivation
of lenders and borrowers, while interacting in the mortgage market, is different.
Lenders call for compensation that adequately prices the risk of the loan, whereas
borrowers look for the loan that allows them to buy the house that best fits their
preferences at the lowest cost. As a result, the market clearing process can be
described by the joint determination of two variables. First, the mortgage interest
3 To change or not to change: the impact of the law on mortgage origination
rate, as it reflects the price of the loan. Second, the loan-to-value ratio, as it
measures the loan risk for lenders, and represents borrowers’ simultaneous choice
of house and loan amount. If the law implies differences in the cost and risk
assessment of a mortgage, then the equilibrium solution may also show differences
at the mortgage interest rate (price channel) or the loan-to-value ratio (collateral
channel).
Under this framework, three questions arise: (i) If judicial states impose higher
foreclosure costs, are their mortgage outcomes at origination different from the
nonjudicial ones? (ii) If non-recourse states impose a smaller debt recovery and a
bigger propensity to default, are their mortgage outcomes at origination different
from the recourse ones? and (iii) Does the mortgage market adjust to differences
in the law through mortgage interest rate (price channel) or loan-to-value ratio
(collateral channel)?
To answer these questions, I study the differences in the mortgage interest
rates and the loan-to-value ratio for more than 3 million observations on fixed-rate
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2011. I find that the mortgage interest rate
is 4.3 to 4.7 basis points higher in judicial states and, therefore, lenders transfer, at
least, part of the extra costs to borrowers. I also find that the loan-to-value ratio is
0.42 to 0.58 percentage points lower in non-recourse states, meaning that lenders
require more collateral to compensate for the lower recovery perspectives. The two
aspects of the law lead to differences in loan characteristics but operate through
different channels. While the foreclosure procedure activates the price channel, the
deficiency judgment activates the collateral one.
But, if the effects of the non-recourse law only appear in a scenario of default,
should we expect a homogeneous effect across loans with different expected loss
levels? In particular, if lenders ask for higher collateralization in non-recourse
states as a way to deter strategic default, should the impact be the same for
collateral constrained and not collateral constrained borrowers? To expand the
results obtained, I study the law impacts along the conditional distribution of the
outcome variable for the collateral channel—the loan-to-value ratio. The results
show that the impact of law for the different types of borrowers is not much
different from the mean results, implying that the higher collateralization in non-
recourse states is not due to the probability of strategic default. In other words, if
lenders asked for more collateral to deter strategic defaults, then the impact would
be stronger for collateral constrained borrowers, as they are closer to an event
of negative equity. I complete the study by running some robustness checks and
conclude that both impacts are fairly robust.
The extensive empirical literature explores the relationship between mortgage
law heterogeneity in the United States and the credit supply but, to my knowledge,
this is the first study to analyze price and collateral effects using a large mortgage
loan-level dataset. Most authors measure the impact of the law on credit supply
through loan size, and the result is not consensual. Pence (2006) applies a
regression-discontinuity design at state boundary to loans originated between 1994
and 1995 and finds that loan sizes are 3 to 7 percent smaller in judicial states.
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He only considers house values at county-level and does not include interest rate
or collateralization data. Mian et al. (2015) report a similar methodology, but use
loans originated in 2005 and data averaged by zip code. They find no evidence that
average loan sizes or total lending are significantly lower in judicial states and argue
that the effect described by Pence (2006) diluted over time. As for the impact of the
law on credit supply through loan prices, most of the results arise from aggregate
data at the state level. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) and Pruszkowski (2017) find
no difference in mortgage interest rates between recourse and non-recourse states
and do not consider differences in the foreclosure procedure. Ambrose et al. (2004)
use loan-level data from 1995 to 1997 provided by a national lender and with
information on 26,179 loans. Although their central question is not the effect of
law on prices and collateralization, the authors find puzzling results with lower
interest rates and higher loan-to-value ratios in non-recourse states.
Another strand of literature emphasizes the role of mortgage law heterogeneity
in the default and foreclosure rates. For the case of judicial foreclosure requirement,
Mian et al. (2015) find that states that did not require judicial foreclosures were
twice as likely to proceed with the foreclosure during the 2007 mortgage crisis. The
effect was not driven by different default rates and does not persist after 2011. Desai
et al. (2013) study the impact of the judicial requirement and non-recourse laws on
default and foreclosures rates across different segments of the mortgage market.
They conclude that the effects are stronger for subprime mortgages and adjustable
rate mortgages. Gerardi et al. (2013) state that judicial requirements do not prevent
foreclosures, and only delays the process. Melzer (2017) argues that the delay in
foreclosing the house creates a debt-overhang problem with the deterioration of
the property condition and consequent reduction in the collateral value. For the
case of non-recourse law, many authors inspect whether or not negative equity is a
sufficient condition to default in non-recourse states (strategic default) or if, on the
contrary, liquidity constraints are the only source of default. Ghent and Kudlyak
(2011) find that borrowers facing negative equity are more likely to default in
non-recourse states, but only for home values above $200, 000. Guiso et al. (2013)
find some evidence of strategic default and conclude that morality and fairness also
plays a role in the decision. Demiroglu et al. (2014) inspect how judicial foreclosures
and non-recourse interact in the likelihood of default on residential mortgages and
conclude that this has a significant effect conditional on having negative equity.
Finally, mortgage law also relates to housing prices. Calomiris et al. (2013) find
that judicial and nonjudicial states evidence different foreclosure start responses,
conditional on equivalent house price and employment shocks. Mian et al. (2015)
document the link between foreclosures and house prices, and use as an instrument
the differences in the foreclosure rate in judicial and nonjudicial states. All in all,
mortgage law heterogeneity generates a lot of research interest, but the conclusions
regarding its impact at origination are not always obvious.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the mortgage law
heterogeneity in the United States. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model
of mortgage origination and the impact of the law. Section 4 presents the data and
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empirical strategy. Section 5 provides results and Section 6 the robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Mortgage law heterogeneity in the U.S.
A mortgage contract gives the lender the right to foreclosure of the home in case
of borrowers’ default. In the U.S., the foreclosure procedure is governed mostly
by state law and reveals a significant heterogeneity among states. After a depth
review of U.S. mortgage law history, Ghent (2014) concluded that the roots of
its heterogeneity go back to the nineteenth century and have no connection with
economic factors. Despite several attempts to uniform the mortgage law at the
national level, the cross-state variation existing today still influences both the
borrower-lender relationship and the foreclosure outcome.1
Following the National Mortgage Servicer’s Reference Directory (NMSRD)
published by USFN (2018), I characterize the state-level differences in two aspects
of the law: foreclosure procedure, and deficiency judgments.2,3 First, as for the
foreclosure procedure, when a borrower becomes delinquent on his mortgage and
the lender wants to proceed with the foreclosure, the law may require a court’s
approval or allow a nonjudicial procedure. In states with judicial foreclosure, the
average time and transaction costs to foreclose the property are generally higher.
In states that allow procedures that do not require courts’ approval (for example,
power-of-sale foreclosures), lenders often choose a nonjudicial option to speed up
the process and increase the recovery value. Thus, states that demand judicial
procedures are more pro-borrower (Ghent 2014).
1. According to Ghent (2014), the bulk of laws developed through case law shows “remarkable
persistence” along time, as they require changes to the civil code of procedures and cannot be
promptly adjusted to the economic conditions. The few changes observed in the U.S. mortgage
laws are frequently pro-borrower and relate to changes in statute law (such as changes in the
redemption periods).
2. The NMSRD is a reference in the mortgage industry and provides information on state
foreclosure processes and regulations. Although it does not systematically organize the changes that
have occurred in U.S. mortgage law, it is possible to identify the most relevant changes over the last
years for each state. For the desegregation of state-level differences, I consider the 50 U.S. states
plus the federal District of Columbia (for simplicity, the District of Columbia is a state). Appendix
A presents state classification for each mortgage law aspect. Appendix B presents differences in the
classification across different sources and studies.
3. There are other state-level differences in law related to housing. For example, the homestead
exemptions that shield a home from some creditors following the bankruptcy filling. The value
of the exemption varies according to state and only protects households in case of unsecured
debt. As it does not prevent a bank foreclosure, it does not directly apply to mortgages (secured
loans). However, some authors recognize that homestead exemptions may influence mortgage default
incentives if households simultaneously hold a positive equity mortgage and unsecured debt (see,
for example, Li et al. (2011) and Hintermaier and Koeniger (2016)). As this indirect effect only
applies to a sub-sample of households not identifiable in the data and depends on the household’s
future demand for unsecured credit, I decided not to consider differences in homestead exemptions
as relevant at origination.
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Figure 1: Distribution of judicial and nonjudicial states.
Note: This figure presents the distribution of judicial and nonjudicial states classified based on
USFN (2018) data. States in lighter color require judicial foreclosures. For more details on the
classification and changes occurred between 2000 and 2016, see Appendix A and B. Map created
with mapchart.net.
The dummy variable Judicial describes the foreclosure procedure classification.
If a state requires a court’s approval to proceed with foreclosure, then it is
classified as judicial (Judicial = 1). All other cases are classified as nonjudicial
(Judicial= 0).4 Figure 1 shows a distribution map of judicial and nonjudicial states
and emphasizes the changes registered between 2000 and 2016.5 The distribution
is balanced.
Second, as for the deficiency judgments, when the debt value exceeds the
market value of the property, the lender may collect a deficiency judgment to
pursue the borrower personally. With a deficiency judgment, the lender can seize
the borrower’s unsecured personal assets and future income to recover the debt
value (Harris and Meir 2015). This possibility is usually known as recourse and
might be automatic, require a judicial decision, or even be forbidden. States that
do not allow recourse are more pro-borrower (Ghent 2014).
4. Including states that allow both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures, but where nonjudicial are
more common.
5. During this period, only three cases—District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Vermont—justified
changes in the classification and all of them in the direction of judicial foreclosure.
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Figure 2: Distribution of recourse and non-recourse states.
Note: This figure presents the distribution of recourse and non-recourse states classified based
on USFN (2018) data. States in lighter color do not allow recourse. For more details on the
classification and changes occured between 2000 and 2016, see Appendix A and B. Map created
with mapchart.net.
The dummy variable NonRecourse describes the restrictions on deficiency
judgments classification. If a state allows deficiency judgments through a process
that has no major obstacles, then it is classified as recourse (NonRecourse = 0).
All other cases are classified as non-recourse (NonRecourse = 1).6 Figure 2 shows
a distribution map of recourse and non-recourse states. The majority of states are
recourse states.
2.1. Orthogonality of mortgage law differences to economic and social
conditions
Relying exclusively on the distribution presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 to explain
the differences in the mortgage interest rate and the collateralization level might
not be sufficient. One of the critical questions that arise is how distinct judicial
and nonjudicial states are regarding other important dimensions. For example,
6. Exceptionally, the classification of the state of Nevada does not follow the NMSRD information.
For the particular case of primary residence single-family mortgages, the state of Nevada passed
a new law that abolished deficiency judgments for loans originated after October 1, 2009 (Li and
Oswald 2017).
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differences in mortgage pricing in judicial states may not be driven by law if
households in judicial states also happen to have a lower income. The same might
apply when comparing non-recourse to recourse states.
To ensure that the mortgage law differences are orthogonal to relevant economic
and social conditions, one needs to show that states with different law classifications
do not differ along with another attribute that independently influences the
mortgage interest rate and the collateralization level.7 I follow an approach similar
to Mian et al. (2015) and test if judicial (non-recourse) states are significantly
different in a set of economic and social attributes grouped into four categories:
(1) demographic and income; (2) GDP; (3) housing market; and (4) mortgage
market variables. By covering a substantial period from 2000 to 2016, I test the
time consistency of the results.8 Table C1 in Appendix C presents the results for the
univariate regressions on whether a state requires judicial foreclosures. For most of
the attributes from 2000-2011, judicial states do not significantly differ from the
nonjudicial ones. The only exception is the fraction of population aged 65 or more
years that is, on average, one percentage point higher in judicial states. As for
2012-2016 there are significant differences in the housing and mortgage market,
which suggests that the assumption of orthogonality may not be valid during this
period.
Table C2 in Appendix C presents the results for the univariate regressions on
whether a state imposes non-recourse. For most of the attributes from 2000-2011,
non-recourse states also do not significantly differ from the recourse ones. As
exceptions are: the fraction of population with 65 or more years that is, on average,
one percentage point lower in non-recourse states; the fraction of population that
is black, which is, on average, six percentage points lower in non-recourse states;
and the mortgage delinquency rate in 2004 and 2006, which is, on average, 30
basis points lower in non-recourse states. As for 2012-2016 there are also some
signs of orthogonality assumption violation in the real GDP annual growth and in
the housing and mortgage market.
Taken together, these results suggest that differences in mortgage law are fairly
independent of other attributes from 2000-2011. However, the same does not apply
for 2012-2016.9 To better understand this distinctive pattern, I inspect the evolution
of the average price of a single-family residence by aspect of law. Figure 3 shows
that prices in judicial states follow a parallel trend to those in nonjudicial states,
at least up to 2011. From 2012 onward, there is a trend detachment that might
independently influence the mortgage interest rate and the collateralization level.
Figure 3 also shows similar results when comparing prices in non-recourse states
7. Several studies assume the orthogonality of the differences in mortgage law, at least for specific
time periods (see, for example, Ghent (2014), Mian et al. (2015) and Milonas (2017)).
8. This approach excludes states where the law was changed between 2000 and 2016.
9. Appendix C presents the univariate regressions for the attributes evaluated every two years. To
conclude that the break in the orthogonality occurred in 2011, I have run the univariate regressions
for that year. However, for the sake of interpretability, I do not report yearly results in Appendix C.
9 To change or not to change: the impact of the law on mortgage origination
to those in recourse states. Even if the break in the trend is not as evident as
for the judicial foreclosure requirement, it is sufficient to question the validity of
orthogonality. As a result, to securely assess the impact of mortgage law on the






















































































































































































































































































































































Non-recourse (left-axis) Recourse (left-axis) | |  (right-axis)
(b) A subfigure
Figure 3: Average price for a single-family residence
Note: This figure shows the evolution of the simple-average price for a single-family residence
according to the aspect of law based on Zillow data available on ❤tt♣s✿✴✴✇✇✇✳③✐❧❧♦✇✳❝♦♠✴
r❡s❡❛r❝❤✴❞❛t❛✴. The dotted line in the upper figure represents the difference between the average
price in nonjudicial vs. judicial states. The difference is relatively stable up to 2012 and is consistent
with the idea of parallel trends. After 2012, the trends detach. The dotted line in the lower figure
represents the difference between the average price in non-recourse vs. recourse states. Although
with a lower magnitude, the trends also detach after 2012.
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3. A simple theory of mortgage origination
The basic idea behind the fundamentals of a market clearing process is that agents
interact in the simultaneous determination of equilibrium price and quantities.
When it comes to credit, and mortgage credit in particular, the dynamics are
more complex. The obligations between borrower and lender do not end with the
settlement of the mortgage contract. In fact, the loan origination is the beginning
of a commitment that usually lasts for a long period, as it only ends with the
debt repayment. To reduce the risk of the contract, lenders grant a secured
loan, introducing a third variable in the simultaneous determination problem—
the collateral value, which for mortgages is the house value. Instead of a standard
price and quantities decision, there is a three-variable solution where the loan
amount, the interest on the loan, and the house value are jointly determined (see,
for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Cerqueiro et al. (2016)). Recognizing
these dynamics of mortgage credit, and to the extent of this simple theory of
mortgage origination, I redefine the problem through a different perspective.
Let’s start by considering the lender’s maximization problem. Lenders seek to
maximize profits for a certain risk level. The price of a loan is the mortgage interest
rate. The costs of a loan are mainly the funding costs and capital charges.10 The
risk of a loan is its expected loss. All elements included in price, costs, and risk
are in percentage values that do not depend on the loan amount. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that lenders base their choices according to a risk-return
per dollar lent, where the risk of a loan is not measured by the loan amount and
house values individually, but rather by the ratio of both. From this perspective,
the relevant decision variables for mortgage supply are the mortgage interest rate
rm, and loan-to-value ratio LTV .
And what about households? Can we assume that the decision variables are also
the interest rate and the loan-to-value ratio? In a theoretical model of mortgage
decision, Brueckner (1994) states that households simultaneously decide the loan
amount and the house value. The loan-to-value ratio LTV is, thus, a relevant
decision variable because households choose a house depending on how much the
lender is willing to lend. The decision also depends on mortgage cost (proxied by the
mortgage interest rate rm), income level, savings, housing needs, and preferences.
For the purpose of this simple theory of mortgage origination, the demand and
supply dynamics are redefined as a function of two variables—rm and LTV . But,
to understand the role of the law at mortgage origination, one need to take a step
back and break up the concept of loan risk for the lender. The expected loss is the
product of the probability of default (PD), and the loss given default (LGD).11
The former reflects how likely is a borrower’s default event. It is a function of the
10. The costs of a loan also include the operating costs. However, in a marginal cost perspective,
operating costs tend to be irrelevant as they mainly include fixed overhead costs.
11. The exact definition of the expected loss includes the exposure at default (EAD). For
mortgages at origination it represents the full loan amount (100%), and is therefore irrelevant.
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borrower’s credit score and the borrower’s incentives to default, which might emerge
along with the life of the contract. The latter represents the amount per dollar that
the lender expects not to recover if the borrower defaults. It is a function of the
loan-to-value ratio, the possibility to seize other assets, and the expected costs to
be incurred in debt recovering (which might include operating, judicial, time, and
other costs).12 Hence, loan risk depends on loan and borrower’s characteristics.
All the other elements influencing the mortgage supply—such as capital charges,
funding cost, or operating costs—do not depend on the loan characteristics, but
rather on time and lender-specific factors.13
3.1. The impact of law
Mortgage law influences loan risk and cost, therefore, it generates direct effects on
the mortgage demand and supply. From the interaction of both, one observes the
total effects through the market equilibrium.
3.1.1. Direct effects — changes in the demand and supply. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) argue that, in a loan contract, while firms focus on what happens under
the no bankruptcy scenario, lenders pay attention to how the actions of the firm
will influence its probability of default, and how can the lender recover the debt in
case of default. Even though firms and households have different incentives, it is
possible to establish some analogy as to the direct effects of mortgage law in the
expected behavior of borrowers and lenders.
Consider a household that looks for funding to buy a house for primary residency.
As the house satisfies a basic need, the borrower will have a strong commitment to
pay the installments on time. Besides, failing the payment shatters the credit score,
and makes it doubtful to get another mortgage. As a result, the default event is not
a credible scenario at origination, and the borrower will not acknowledge the impact
of the mortgage law in a potential foreclosure process.14 But, even if the borrowers’
decision process would acknowledge law criteria, it would only be binding if he was
available to change his residency to another state.15 It is, thus, reasonable to assume
12. As a reference, Repullo and Suarez (2004) derive a loan pricing equation where the equilibrium
interest rate increases with the PD and the LGD. They also find that the equilibrium interest rates
increase with the required level of capital and with the exposure to systematic risk, which, for the
present study, are treated as time and lender-specific.
13. Capital charges represent the unexpected loan loss and, depending on the regulatory setting,
might be loan-specific. For example, Basel III recommends that the capital charges on mortgages
must consider the loan-to-value ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2017). In the U.S.
case, the Federal Reserve decided not to include this recommendation in the adoption of the Basel
III criteria (Department of Treasury and Federal Reserve System 2013).
14. Exceptionally, one might assume that the non-recourse could influence the mortgage demand
by relaxing the household concerns in case of default.
15. Exceptionally, law differences can be binding for households that live near the border of a state
with different laws.
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a limited influence of law heterogeneity on the mortgage demand. Contrarily, on
the supply side, the effects are not negligible and dependent on the type of law.
Foreclosure procedure: In states that require judicial foreclosure procedures, lenders
face additional costs and will, on average, take more time to conclude the
foreclosure. Different authors recognize this increase in the foreclosure costs (such
as Pence (2006), Mian et al. (2015), Shibut and Singer (2015), and others)
which can go as high as 10% of the loan balance, according to Pence (2006).
In a more general approach, Cerqueiro et al. (2016) also recognize that the legal
mechanisms influence the value of the collateral as they determine when and how
the secured assets can be seized. The higher costs in recovering the debt imply,
ceteris paribus, a higher loss given default when compared to nonjudicial states.
On the borrowers’ side, judicial foreclosure procedures provide more protection
and delay the foreclosure process, but it should not change borrowers’ incentives
to default. Overall, for loans with similar characteristics, I anticipate that the
mechanism through which the expected loss increases in judicial states operates
mainly through loss given default.
Restrictions on deficiency judgments: When recourse is not allowed, the value of
the house given as collateral limits the debt recovery. The lender cannot seize other
assets of the borrower, nor his income. With lower recovery opportunities, lenders
face a higher loss given default, ceteris paribus, when compared to recourse states.
Further, when recourse is not allowed, borrowers have more incentives to default
when the loan balance exceeds the value of the house (negative equity). This
event is well documented in the literature and is known as strategic default. Ghent
and Kudlyak (2011) find that borrowers with properties appraised at more than
$200, 000 are 30% more likely to default in non-recourse states. Overall, for loans
with similar characteristics, I anticipate that the mechanism through which the
expected loss increases in non-recourse states operates both through the probability
of default and the loss given default.
With a higher expected loss in judicial and non-recourse states (borrower-
friendly laws), one will expect that lenders adjust the pricing of mortgages by
requiring, ceteris paribus, a higher risk premium. The more skin in the game, the
more the lender calls for risk compensation. If mortgage law influences loan risk,
then there should be a direct effect on the mortgage supply.
3.1.2. Total effects — changes in the mortgage market equilibrium. Direct effects
determine how borrowers and lenders change their behavior in the presence of
different law contexts, whereas total effects are the result of their interaction. Due
to the joint determination of rm and LTV , the adjustment mechanism might
operate through two channels:
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• Price channel, when the mortgage interest rate increases to reflect the higher
risk and cost in borrower-friendly states (higher rm);
• Collateral channel, when the collateral requirements increase to compensate
for the increased risk in borrower-friendly states (lower LTV ).
4. Data and empirical strategy
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics
This paper combines a variety of data sources. Besides the NMSRD for the
mortgage law, I use the Freddie Mac’s Single Family Loan-Level Dataset16 for data
on individual mortgages, and FRED Economic Data for data on market interest
rates.
Freddie Mac Single Family Loan-Level Dataset comprises a portion of single
family mortgages acquired or guaranteed by Freddie Mac. The data is publicly
available for research purposes, which guarantees reproducibility and allows for
study extension. It includes fully amortizing fixed-rate mortgages and has the
comparative advantage of having information on interest rates.17
I restrict the sample period to loans originated between 2001 and 2011, to
comply with the orthogonality assumption discussed in Section 2.1. The loan
origination information is available by quarter/year. The selected sample includes
mortgages granted for the purchase of a single-family primary residency, with
a fixed interest rate, minimum amount of $50, 000 and original term between
25 and 35 years, and whose associated property locates in one of the states
considered in Section 2.18 In addition to the variables directly provided, I compute
the borrower’s monthly income (Income) through the monthly installments and
the decomposition of the debt to income ratio. I also compute the loan-to-income
ratio as the loan amount per dollar of monthly income (LTI).
All loans in the sample are fixed rate mortgages. To compare fixed interest rates
from different periods and isolate the credit risk premium, I follow an approach
similar to Basten et al. (2018) and compute the Spread as the difference between
the mortgage interest rate and the refinancing costs under full hedging of interest
rate risk. In their work, the interest rate risk immunization strategy contemplates
the repricing period of the mortgage as reference for the interest rate swap maturity.
However, in the U.S., fixed rate mortgages have no interest rate resetting and no
16. Available in ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❢r❡❞❞✐❡♠❛❝✳❝♦♠✴r❡s❡❛r❝❤✴❞❛t❛s❡ts✴s❢❴❧♦❛♥❧❡✈❡❧❴❞❛t❛s❡t✳
♣❛❣❡ as of August 2018
17. It excludes government-insured mortgages, affordable mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages,
mortgages with credit enhancements other than primary mortgage insurance, and mortgages with
not verified documentation.
18. Minor adjustments were made due to the presence of data inconsistencies. For further details
please contact the author.
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prepayment penalty, meaning that the fixed interest rate is valid up to the maturity
date (25 to 35 years) or the loan prepayment, which ever one is first.19 Given that
the loan prepayment is unknown at origination, I assume that the quarterly average
30-year interest rate swap is the most adequate hedging instrument to compute
the Spread.20 Since mortgage rates are usually defined in advance of closing the
deal, I lag the 30-year interest rate swap one quarter.
mean sd min max Description
Spread 78 47 -304 496 Mortgage spread to previous
period 30Y swap rate (bps)
Amount 180,557 92,792 50,000 1,403,000 Mortgage amount ($)
Value 238,181 144,902 50,000 5,214,286 House value ($)
LTV 79.38 13.75 6.00 105.00 Loan-to-value ratio (pp)
LTI 59.16 18.72 1.24 132.13 Loan-to-income ratio
CreditScore 730 54 300 850 Credit score
Income 3,391 2,693 413 298,465 Borrowers’ monthly income ($)
DFirstTime 0.27 0.44 0 1 =1 if First-time homebuyer
DSingleBorrower 0.42 0.49 0 1 =1 if Single borrower
Judicial 0.46 0.50 0 1 =1 if in a judicial state
NonRecourse 0.37 0.48 0 1 =1 if in a non-recourse state
Observations 3,145,276
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Judicial Nonjudicial NonRecourse Recourse
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Spread 81 47 76 47 77 47 79 47
Amount 175,120 90,239 185,171 94,660 188,946 96,638 175,598 90,074
Value 230,047 139,253 245,084 149,181 251,139 154,399 230,521 138,413
LTV 79.65 13.71 79.15 13.77 78.99 13.80 79.61 13.71
LTI 58.69 18.64 59.57 18.77 60.11 18.66 58.60 18.73
CreditScore 729 54 731 54 731 54 730 55
Income 3,316 2,591 3,455 2,774 3,475 2,696 3,342 2,690
DFirstTime 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44
DSingleBorrower 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.49
NonRecourse 0.19 0.39 0.53 0.50 0.23 0.42 0.59 0.49
Observations 1,443,938 1,701,338 1,168,552 1,976,724
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Judicial Foreclosure Requirement and by Non-Recourse Law
19. To immunize interest rate risk, lenders match the duration of assets and liabilities. In the
determination of the mortgage duration, it is important to account for the possibility of principal
prepayment. However, as it is an uncertain event that varies with the interest rate level and economic
environment, the computation of the duration will depend on the specification of the option exercise
(Mattey 2000).
20. As a robustness check, I assume that the prepayment occurs after 10 years and compute the
Spread as the difference between the mortgage interest rate and the 10-year Treasury yield. This
approach is presented in Section 6.1.
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Table 1 presents summary statistics of the loan-level data used.21 The
3, 145, 276 loans are distributed along 11 years and 44 quarters. The average loan
has a Spread of 78 basis points, an Amount of $180, 557, a LTV of 79.38%, and a
LTI of 59 times the monthly income. On average the borrower has a CreditScore
of 730 and an Income of $3, 391. The sample is well distributed among judicial and
nonjudicial states, with 46% of loans subject to judicial foreclosure. It is also fairly
distributed among recourse and non-recourse states, with 37% of loans subject to
non-recourse regime. Table 2 presents the summary statistics by aspect of law:
judicial foreclosure requirement and non-recourse law.22
4.2. Data caveats and opportunities
The use of the Freddie Mac dataset is not without caveats. First, the dataset
only includes loans acquired or secured by Freddie Mac, which might form a
biased representation of the market. If the lender took advantage of having more
information about the loans and, thus, sold the lower quality ones, than the dataset
would entail a problem of adverse selection. Second, both government-sponsored
enterprises (GSE) and purchasers of securitized mortgage-backed securities might
not differentiate the risk of mortgage laws—intentionally or for lack of due
diligence.23 If the lender recognizes that the third parties are blind to the impact
of law on risk, then he might also neglect this risk at origination if the intention is
to sell the mortgage in the secondary market. As a cross reference of this second
caveat, Mian et al. (2015) argue that the third parties’ risk blindness along with
the intensified presence of GSEs in the mortgage market, justify the weakening of
the credit supply differences in nonjudicial states that were initially shown by Pence
(2006).
These two caveats, however, do not jeopardize this study. At the origination,
the lender may not have yet the intention to sell the mortgage to a third party.24
At the sale, the risk is not necessarily fully transferred to Freddie Mac.25. And, as
Pence (2006) argues, lenders and third parties interact in a repeated game, where
a history of bad risk assessment might dictate the end of their relationship. It is,
21. Summary statistics by year presented in Appendix D.
22. As Table 1 shows, some loans have a negative Spread, which might look unusual. Besides
being few loans, some negative Spread are a result of computing it as the difference to the swap
rate. I decided to maintain the loans in the sample, to avoid discretionary adjustments.
23. For example, the Freddie Mac’s Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide (Freddie Mac 2020)
that establishes the requirements relating to the purchase of mortgages, makes no distinction of
foreclosure procedure or deficiency judgments.
24. While some lenders proceed with the loan underwriting with the clear intention to sell the
mortgage very soon after closing on the contract, others postpone the decision.
25. For example, loans with a LTV ratio in excess of 80% sold to Freddie Mac must comply with
one of three options: (i) have a mortgage insurance provided by the lender or other entity on the
portion that exceeds the 80% LTV ratio; (ii) keep all risks and costs of a borrower default on the
lenders/seller-side; or (iii) be sold on a participation basis (Freddie Mac 2020)
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therefore, not definite that loans on the dataset are different from the loans kept
on the lenders’ balance sheet.
But, most of all, even under the hypothesis that loans sold to Freddie Mac
enclose loose credit standards, any evidence of differences derived by mortgage law
heterogeneity found with this dataset imply that the effects on the entire market
should be at least equal, but probably greater.
The use of the Freddie Mac dataset is also an opportunity. To my knowledge,
former studies on the impact of law on mortgage outcomes disregard the impact on
mortgage pricing (see, for example, Pence (2006) and Mian et al. (2015)), evaluate
the price effects at aggregate level (see, for example, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011)
and Pruszkowski (2017)), or use small private datasets (see, for example, Ambrose
et al. (2004)). The lack of loan-level data with interest rate information makes it
difficult to assess the price effects of mortgage law.26 That is where the Freddie
Mac dataset emerges as an opportunity. By providing information on interest rate,
collateral value, borrower’s risk, borrower’s income, and others, the Freddie Mac
dataset broadens the research opportunities.
As a final and general caveat, that applies to any dataset on U.S. mortgage data,
is the strong presence of secondary market institutions and mortgage insurance
companies, and the possible distortion that they might cause in the market
outcomes, and in the loan characteristics. For example, Green and Wachter (2005)
argue that these institutions blur the difference in the mortgage supply for high-risk
and low-risk borrowers, while providing a solution for the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
pooling problem. If this is the case, then any study on the impact of mortgage law
heterogeneity in the U.S. most acknowledge that the mortgage risk assessment and
pricing might be biased.
4.3. Empirical strategy
To identify the impact of mortgage law on loan characteristics, one would ideally
want to observe the effects of an exogenous and not policy-oriented change in
the law. In the absence of that event, I could alternatively study the interactions
between borrowers and lenders at origination in different law contexts (from loan
applications to bank responses) to disentangle the effects of law on mortgage
demand and supply. Neither of both is possible. First, no event proxies a randomized
experiment of a change in the law.27 Second, the U.S. is the most representative
26. The most comprehensive source of publicly available information on loan origination in the
United States is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data but, up to 2018, it does not
include loan price information. The information on the interest rate, loan term, introductory rate
period, and others were only available after the 2018 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (effective in
January 2018 for submissions due in March 2019) (FFIEC 2018).
27. As set in Section 2, Nevada passed legislation on October 1, 2009 that abolished recourse
on mortgages granted with the purpose of purchasing a single-family home. However, this change
in the law emerged as a response to the mortgage crisis and cannot be considered a random (not
policy-oriented) change in law. Moreover, the data available for the transition period is not sufficient.
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example of mortgage law heterogeneity, but no dataset includes simultaneously
loan applications, loan pricing, and loan collateralization for a significant period.28
Even for other geographic regions, detailed mortgage-level information that allows
for a clear separation of mortgage demand and supply with price information is
usually not publicly available.29
Given the availability of data, the solution includes a baseline model and a
detailed approach that considers the conditional distribution of the LTV ratio.
4.3.1. Baseline model. The identification strategy departs from the observation
of the mortgage law heterogeneity across U.S. states and the assumption of
orthogonality to other economic and social factors from 2001 to 2011. If the
mortgage law is randomly assigned, then there are no confounding factors in
the treatment assignment, and the multivariate analysis is an appropriate method
to evaluate the impact of the law. A second econometric challenge is the joint
determination of the mortgage interest rate and the collateralization level, as
discussed in Section 3. To deal with this endogeneity issue, I estimate the reduced-
form equations for the mortgage interest rate spread and the loan-to-value ratio.
This approach is similar to the one followed by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014).
Equation (1) sets the estimation for Spread and Equation (2) for the LTV
Spreadi,j,t = β10 + β11Log(Income)i + β12Log(Income)
2
i + β13LTIi
+ β14CreditScorei + β15DSingleBorroweri + β16DFirstT imei
+ β17Judiciali,t + β18NonRecoursei,t
+Φ1t +Ω1j + ε, (1)
LTVi,j,t = β20 + β21Log(Income)i + β22Log(Income)
2
i + β23LTIi
+ β24CreditScorei + β25DSingleBorroweri + β26DFirstT imei
+ β27Judiciali,t + β28NonRecoursei,t
+Φ2t +Ω2j + ε, (2)
for loan i, seller j, and year t. The Φ are year fixed-effects to control for
year nationwide shocks that might influence demand or supply. The Ω are seller
fixed-effects to control for heterogeneity in interest rate setting and collateral
requirements, due to the seller’s specific characteristics of liquidity, capitalization,
and relationship lending (Gambacorta 2008). As the error terms can display a
potentially time-varying seller component from changes in seller’s strategies, I
cluster the residuals by seller.
28. See footnote 26.
29. Some exceptions include Basten et al. (2018) and Basten (2020) that use a sample of the
Swiss mortgage market and Michelangeli and Sette (2016) that make use of simulations.
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As discussed in Section 3, mortgage laws have a direct impact on the expected
loss. Yet, the mechanism through which they influence the mortgage market
equilibrium is distinct. The judicial foreclosure requirement implies higher costs
in case of default (both time and monetary costs), but it is not expected to change
the borrower’s probability of default. As a result, in the market equilibrium, lenders
might require a risk premium to compensate for the higher recovery costs (β17 > 0
, price channel), or might input the extra recovery costs in the collateral value
and require more collateral (β27 < 0, collateral channel). Both mechanisms are
coherent with Cerqueiro et al. (2016) empirical evidence on collateral functions
and the impact of legal tools.
The way through which non-recourse enforcement increases the expected loss
is different. First, the probability of default might be higher due to the lack of
borrower’s incentives to comply with the contract in the presence of a scenario of
negative equity caused by a downward housing market. Second, the loss given
default might be higher, if lenders consider realistic expectations to seize the
borrower’s other assets and income in recourse states. As a result, in the market
equilibrium, lenders might require a risk premium to compensate for the higher
expected loss (β18 > 0, price channel) or require higher collateralization (β28 < 0,
collateral channel), both to compensate for the higher loss given default or to
decrease the probability of a negative equity scenario.30 Table 3 summarizes the
foreseen differences in the expected loss for the different mortgage laws, as well as
the expected changes in the mortgage market equilibrium (total effects).
Mortgage Law
Expected Loss Mortgage Market Equilibrium
Prob. of default Loss given default Price channel Collateral channel
(PD) (LGD) (Spread) (LTV)
β17 β27
Judicial no effect + 0 / + 0 / -
β18 β28
Non-recourse no effect / + + 0 / + 0 / -
Table 3. Expected effects of mortgage law
4.3.2. Law effects dependent on conditional distribution of the LTV ratio. The
baseline approach focuses on the average effect of the law on mortgage pricing
and collateralization level. It does not consider that the impact might diverge
according to the conditional distribution of the LTV ratio. Put differently, the
30. The lower the LTV ratio, the less probable is a negative equity event.
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baseline approach ignores that the impact of the law might be different for collateral
constrained borrowers and not collateral constrained ones.
For example, it assumes that the impact of non-recourse law in the collateral
requirements is the same for a not collateral constrained borrower that asks for a
loan with a LTV ratio of 40%, and a collateral constrained borrower that asks for
a loan with a LTV ratio of 85%. Yet, the impact of non-recourse law induced by
the probability of strategic default is quite different. While for the not collateral
constrained borrower the occurrence of a negative equity event requires a decrease
in house value of more than 60%, for the collateral constrained borrower it only
requires a decrease of more than 15%. The scenario of strategic default is, therefore,
highly unlikely when the collateral constrain is not bidding. If lenders require more
collateral to deter strategic default, then one would expect that the not collateral
constrained borrower would not be affected.
To fix ideas, one should start by defining what is a collateral constrained
borrower in the framework of the U.S. mortgage market. Usually, lenders prefer to
grant conforming loans, as these loans are easily traded in the secondary market.31
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) sets, annually, the limits on the
loan amount for conforming loans, and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae set the
guidelines on loan characteristics. Loans with LTV ratios above 80% can classify
as conforming loans and be sold to Freddie Mac, but require additional protection
in case of borrowers’ default.32 This criteria sets the mode for the typical loan, as
going above 80% implies increasing costs. As a result, it is possible to classify each
loan according to the conditional distribution of the LTV ratio and to the type of
borrower:
• Type I (LTV ratio below 80%) - the borrower is not collateral constrained, as
he could have asked for a higher loan to buy the house.
• Type II (LTV ratio of 80%) - the borrower might be collateral constrained,
as he asked for the maximum loan amount that did not require additional
protection to classify as conforming.
• Type III (LTV ratio above 80%) - the borrower is collateral constrained, as he
chose to obtain a higher loan, even if that meant paying for private mortgage
insurance.
Figure 4 presents the empirical cumulative distribution function of the LTV
ratio for the loans included in the data. It shows pattern breaks around 30th and
70th quantiles, consistent with the above classification. Up to around the 30th
quantile, mortgages have an LTV ratio below 80% and show a concave distribution.
From the 30th quantile to a little before the 70th quantile, mortgages have an LTV
31. Either through a government-sponsored enterprise or a private issue of mortgage-backed
securities.
32. As set in Section 4.2.
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ratio of 80%, and reflect a flat distribution. Afterwards, mortgages have an LTV
ratio mostly between 80% and 95%, with higher values as exceptional cases.
If the effects of the law depend on the possible occurrence of a default event—
which in turn depends on the type of borrower—is it reasonable to rely only on
average effects estimated by Equation (2)? Or should we consider that the law
effects vary according to the conditional distribution of the LTV ratio and the type
of borrower? To test these hypothesis, I follow Koenker and Bassett (1978) and start
by inspecting if the assumption of normality of residuals in Equation (2) is strictly
satisfied.33 If the distribution of the LTV ratio residuals does not approximate a
normal distribution, I proceed by applying a quantile regression method. Besides
not making assumptions on the parametric distribution of residuals, the quantile
regression method allows for the estimation of explanatory variables’ effects at
different points of the LTV conditional distribution. It is also more robust in the
presence of outliers as it considers median regression, rather than mean regression.
For the Type I borrowers, I analyze intratype effects at the 10th, 15th, 20th,
and 25th quantiles, whereas for the Type II and III, I analyze the mid-points set by
the 50th and 85th quantiles. I apply a quantile method with the same rationale as
the baseline model.34,35
33. OLS methods model the conditional mean and assume a normal distribution of residuals,
which ignores that responses can vary across the conditional distribution of the dependent variable.
The violation of the normality assumption renders OLS estimators that are valid, but inefficient. In
that case the use of an alternative approach is justified.
34. I use the STATA module xtqreg to estimate quantile regressions according to the method
proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019) with seller and year fixed effects. Instead of clustering
the errors by seller, I use bootstrap standard errors as recommended by Baum (2013).
35. I do not study the conditional distribution of the Spread because there is no fundamental
argument to do it. While the distribution of the LTV ratio relates to the collateral constrains of
the borrower, the same does not apply to the price of mortgages.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution of the LTV ratio.
Note: This figure presents the empirical cumulative distribution function of the LTV ratio.
Approximately, 30% of the mortgages have a LTV ratio below 80% (Type I borrowers - not
collateral constrained), 40% have a LTV ratio of 80% (Type II borrowers - might be collateral
constrained), and 30% have a LTV ratio above 80% (Type III borrowers - collateral constrained).
5. Results
5.1. Baseline model results
Table 4 presents the OLS estimation of the reduced-form Equations (1) and (2),
with and without seller fixed-effects. As for the price channel, Equation (1), judicial
requirements significantly increase the mortgage spread (β17 greater than 0),
whereas non-recourse law does not affect the price (β18 not significantly different
from 0). Lenders require monetary compensation for the increased foreclosure
costs—induced by the judicial requirements—but not for the lower recovery
opportunities and increased probability of default—originated by the non-recourse
law. On average, the mortgage interest rate in judicial states is approximately 4.3
to 4.7 basis points higher than in nonjudicial ones.
As for the collateral channel, Equation (2), judicial requirements do not decrease
the LTV (β27 not significantly different from 0), whereas non-recourse law implies
a lower LTV ratio (β28 lower than 0). Lenders require more collateralization given
the lower recovery opportunities and increased probability of default—originated
by the non-recourse law—but not for the increased foreclosure costs—induced by
the judicial requirements. On average, the loan-to-value ratio is approximately 0.42
to 0.58 percentage points lower in non-recourse states.
But why is the collateral channel silent in judicial states, and why is the price
channel functioning? According to the evidence gathered by Cerqueiro et al. (2016),
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Spread Spread LTV LTV
LogIncome -28.709∗∗ -27.960∗∗ 49.094∗∗∗ 49.327∗∗∗
(9.617) (9.058) (2.717) (2.709)
LogIncome2 1.131∗ 1.108∗ -3.066∗∗∗ -3.063∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.502) (0.165) (0.166)
LTI -0.286∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
CreditScore -0.133∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
DSingleBorrower 3.646∗∗∗ 3.566∗∗∗ 1.995∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.474) (0.081) (0.075)
DFirstTime 1.746∗ 2.512∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 4.066∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.917) (0.225) (0.162)
Judicial 4.698∗∗∗ 4.305∗∗∗ 0.303 0.167
(0.249) (0.207) (0.186) (0.170)
NonRecourse -0.050 0.219 -0.583∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗
(0.170) (0.234) (0.129) (0.138)
FE Year yes yes yes yes
FE Seller no yes no yes
N 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276
R2 0.327 0.332 0.096 0.106
Table 4. Effects of law on Spread and LTV
This tables presents coefficients of the OLS specification for Spread and LTV on law dummies—
Judicial and NonRecourse. Standard errors are clustered by seller. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ and + are statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level,
respectively.
both should be active. But, if only the price one is effective, one can conclude that
lenders consider the extra cost from judicial foreclosures as an operating limitation
that makes the loan activity more expensive, rather than a devaluation of the
collateral value per se. Lenders do not input the judicial cost to the collateral
value.
And why is the price channel silent in non-recourse states, and why is the
collateral channel functioning? One possible reason for a silent price channel is
that lenders in recourse states usually face judicial costs to seize borrower’s other
assets and income. These costs can offset the value of the recovery opportunities
and apparently silence the price channel. As for an effective collateral channel,
there are two possible reasons. First, non-recourse laws imply a zero recovery
beyond the house value, therefore lenders require a lower LTV ratio to, ceteris
paribus, increase the protection against default. Second, lenders might want to
avoid strategic defaults by reducing the probability of an event of negative equity.




















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.4280
LTV - OLS model - residuals distribution
Figure 5: Residuals distribution on the LTV ratio regression
Note: This figure presents the distribution of the residuals on the estimation of Equation (2) with
year and seller fixed effects. The estimated residuals (Kernel density estimate) violate the assumption
of normality distribution represented by the dash line.
With higher collateralization, it is less probable that the debt value will exceed the
house value during the life of the contract.
The latter argument provides one of the motivations for the next subsection.
If lenders require more collateral in non-recourse states as a way to deter strategic
default, then the effect of law should differ for different points of the LTV ratio
conditional distribution.
5.2. Law effects dependent on the conditional distribution of the LTV
ratio
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the residuals of Equation (2) with year and
seller fixed-effects. The distribution of the residuals on the LTV ratio regression
violates the normality assumption.36 As a result, OLS estimators in Table 4 are
valid but inefficient, which justifies the use of a quantile regression method.37
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the LTV ratio quantile regression
with seller and year fixed effects. As expected, the effects of explanatory variables
vary across quantiles, and the differences are particularly relevant for the variable
36. Normality tests, like Shapiro-Wilk W or Shapiro-Francia, are not valid for large samples. The
normality of residuals distribution can only be validated through visual inspection.
37. The conditional distribution of Spread is not relevant for Section 4.3.2 argument.
Nevertheless, E presents the distribution of the residuals of Equation (1) with year and seller fixed-
effects. There is no evidence of normality assumption violation for the Spread regression.
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Income. On the other hand, the effect of non-recourse law shows little divergence
across quantiles, and not in the expected direction. The collateral requirements
due to non-recourse law are higher for not collateral constrained borrowers than for
collateral constrained ones. This result overrules the hypothesis that lenders require
a lower LTV ratio in non-recourse states to deter borrowers from strategic default.
If it was true, the effects should be stronger for collateral constrained borrowers
(Type III) because they are the first to strategic default in a scenario of a falling
housing market. For Type III borrowers, the LTV ratio is 0.30 percentage points
lower in non-recourse states, whereas for Type II borrowers, it is 0.41 percentage
points lower. The results are even more striking for differences within the Type I
borrowers. If lenders demand more collateral to deter strategic default, then the
effect of non-recourse on not collateral constrained borrowers with loans with low
LTV ratios should be almost negligible. Yet, the impact of non-recourse within
the Type I borrowers is decreasing with the quantiles. For borrowers belonging to
the 10th quantile, the LTV ratio is 0.58 percentage points lower in non-recourse































Type I Type I Type I Type I/II Type II Type III
OLS Q(0.10) Q(0.15) Q(0.20) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.85)
LogIncome 49.327∗∗∗ 119.644∗∗∗ 95.423∗∗∗ 79.919∗∗∗ 69.671∗∗∗ 42.610∗∗∗ -2.516
(2.709) (4.688) (3.459) (2.252) (2.421) (1.630) (1.599)
LogIncome2 -3.063∗∗∗ -7.163∗∗∗ -5.750∗∗∗ -4.847∗∗∗ -4.249∗∗∗ -2.671∗∗∗ -0.040
(0.166) (0.291) (0.216) (0.137) (0.150) (0.099) (0.098)
LTI 0.046∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CreditScore -0.055∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
DSingleBorrower 2.015∗∗∗ 3.538∗∗∗ 3.013∗∗∗ 2.677∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗∗ 1.869∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.160) (0.129) (0.085) (0.093) (0.069) (0.058)
DFirstTime 4.066∗∗∗ 7.520∗∗∗ 6.330∗∗∗ 5.569∗∗∗ 5.065∗∗∗ 3.736∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.375) (0.232) (0.216) (0.165) (0.138) (0.207)
Judicial 0.167 0.221 0.203 0.190 0.183 0.161 0.126
(0.170) (0.234) (0.218) (0.169) (0.186) (0.137) (0.153)
NonRecourse -0.421∗∗ -0.582∗∗ -0.526∗∗ -0.491∗∗ -0.467∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.200) (0.175) (0.190) (0.136) (0.120) (0.073)
FE Year and Seller yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276
Table 5. Effects of law on the conditional distribution of LTV
This tables presents coefficients of the OLS and the Quantile Regression specification for LTV on law dummies—Judicial and NonRecourse. Quantiles
defined according to the type of borrower. Standard errors are bootstrapped by seller with 100 repetitions. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and + are
statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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If the argument of strategic default avoidance is not valid to justify the higher
collateralization level in non-recourse states, then it only remains the justification
that lenders might require less collateral in recourse states because they have
realistic expectations of seizing the borrower’s other assets and income.
As for the impact of judicial foreclosures, there are no differences across
quantiles and the effect is null. This means that the collateral channel is not
activated to compensate for judicial foreclosure requirement, independently of the
type of borrower.
6. Robustness tests
As robustness checks, I run three additional models. First, I use an alternative
definition of Spread that considers the hypothesis of prepayment of principal.
Second, I test if the effects previewed in the baseline model prevail when we consider
the secondary mortgages associated with the same property. Third, I test the time
dependency of the results obtained.
6.1. Alternative definition of Spread
The definition of Spread used in this study assumes that by deducting the
refinancing costs under full hedging of interest rate to the mortgage interest rate,
one obtains the credit risk premium. By using the 30-year interest rate swap as
reference rate, it does not consider the possibility of mortgage prepayment in the
hedging strategy. Yet, in the U.S mortgage market prepayment is frequent and
motivated by a variety of reasons.38
To address this concern, I redefine Spread as the difference between the
mortgage interest rate and the lagged quarterly average 10-year Treasury yield
and name it Spread2. I use the 10-year Treasury yield for three reasons: first,
several studies use Treasury rates as a reference for computing credit risk premium
(for example, Krainer and LeRoy (2010)); second, lenders use Treasury securities as
benchmarks to set up mortgage rates (Justiniano et al. 2016); and third, borrowers
usually repay the mortgage before the maturity and ten years is a good proxy for
principal prepayment (Ambrose et al. 2004).
This approach, however, does not control for the co-movement between
mortgage and Treasury rates, neither controls for the term structure. To account
for the pattern of the expectations for interest rates, I follow an approach similar
38. Chernov et al. (2018) study the mortgage prepayment risk in the US for the period between
1998 and 2014. They find that the average implied prepayment rate is 25.13% and the average
empirical prepayment rate is 20.96%. Hall and Maingi (2019) point out some of the reasons that lead
to mortgage termination, which include: refinancing with a new mortgage with better conditions;
refinancing with a new mortgage with a higher balance; paying off the mortgage as the better
strategy when comparing alternative savings investments; paying off the mortgage to exchange the
house; defaulting, and homeowner’s death.
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to Justiniano et al. (2016) and control for four additional variables—Level, Slope,
Curvature, and V olatility60d. The first three represent the quarterly average of
the term-structure factors for Treasuries (Level, Slope, and Curvature), and are
obtained through principal components analysis. The latter represents the quarterly
average of a volatility indicator (V olatility60d) and is computed as the realized
volatility of the daily 2-year Treasury yield over a rolling 60-day window.
Table F1 in Appendix F presents the results of the estimation of the baseline
model for the Spread2. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented
on Table 4, which confirms Section 5.1 conclusions.
6.2. Combined LTV ratio
At the origination of a purchase mortgage loan, borrowers occasionally ask for
a secondary mortgage that is associated with the same property as the primary
mortgage, but that can have different characteristics, such as interest rate and
maturity. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that lenders evaluate the risk by
considering the entire exposure associated with the mortgaged property. To test
if the impact of law remains the same when we consider the entire exposure, I
re-estimate Equation (2) by using the combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV ) at
origination instead of the LTV ratio.
Table F2 in Appendix F presents the OLS results for the CLTV regression.The
results are consistent with the ones presented in Table 4. Judicial foreclosure
requirements do not impact the collateralization level, whereas the non-recourse
law leads to a lower CLTV ratio of approximately 0.42 to 0.50 percentage points.
These results confirm the conclusions presented in Section 5.1.
6.3. Law effects dependent on the time frame
The baseline approach includes year fixed effects that control for nationwide shocks,
and captures time-specific dynamics of the mortgage market. Nevertheless, to
inspect Mian et al. (2015) argument that the credit supply effects related to judicial
foreclosures requirement found by Pence (2006) have weakened over time39, I re-
estimated the reduced-form equations by interacting law with year dummies.
Table F3 in Appendix F presents the OLS results for the Spread and
LTV regressions with year-law interactions. As for the price channel, judicial
requirements significantly increase the mortgage spread for most of the years, and
the effect varies from 1.5 to 6.5 basis points. The only exceptions are 2010 and
2011, for which the effect is not significantly different from zero. As for the collateral
channel, the impact of non-recourse on the LTV ratio is also significant for most
of the sample, and varies from 0.33 to 0.78 percentage points. The only exceptions
are 2001, 2009 and 2010.
39. Mian et al. (2015)’s argument focus on the period between 2000 and 2005.
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Despite the evidence of a price and collateral channel for most of the sample
period, one cannot disregard the hypothesis that, in some periods, lenders might
assign a low probability to scenarios of substantial house prices declines (Gerardi
et al. 2013) and, thus, not penalize judicial foreclosures and non-recourse. By
inspecting the evolution of Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, there is
anecdotal evidence that points to the coincidence of a depressed housing market
with the verification of silent price and collateral channels.40
7. Conclusion
Mortgage laws influence the debt recovery process in case of default and, thus,
impact the cost and risk of mortgages for lenders. Depending on the type of law,
the effects might materialize in a higher probability of default, a higher loss given
default, or both. By focusing on the U.S. mortgage market, I analyze the judicial
foreclosure requirement and the non-recourse enforcement, as borrower-friendly
laws that increase the mortgage cost and risk. I use a loan-level dataset to assess
how the law influences loan characteristics at origination, and consider two possible
channels: price and collateral channels.
I find that judicial foreclosures activate a price channel, with the mortgage
interest rate being 4.3 to 4.7 basis points higher in judicial states. The results
suggest that lenders charge a premium to compensate for higher monetary and
time costs incurred in judicial processes. This effect is fairly robust, even if it shows
some variation over time. On the other hand, there is no evidence that judicial
foreclosures lead to higher collateral requirements.
As for the non-recourse law, I find that it activates a collateral channel, with
mortgages in non-recourse states having a lower loan-to-value ratio of about 0.42 to
0.58 percentage points. I also find that the collateral requirements in non-recourse
states are not higher for collateral constrained borrowers, which means that they do
not arise as a way to deter strategic default. Higher collateralization levels in non-
recourse states derive from lower opportunities to recover the debt as the lender
cannot seize other borrower’s assets and income, other than the house given as
collateral.
These results provide new insights into the consequences of changing mortgage
law. This contribution is key for any policy agent that has the power to suggest
or enforce changes to the mortgage law, whether to protect households or to
strengthen the mortgage market. However, it is not in this study objectives to
set any normative conclusion on what type of law should be considered as more
beneficial. Whether it is better to have a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure procedure
ultimately depends on the objectives of the policymaker.
40. Figure F1 in Appendix F shows the evolution of Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index
and emphasizes the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.
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The policymaker might want to protect borrowers by guaranteeing an impartial
assessment of the foreclosure or by extending the time of a primary residence
foreclosure process. In that case, the policymaker prefers a judicial foreclosure
procedure, but what he needs to acknowledge is that these household’s benefits
come at the cost of a higher price for the mortgage. Alternatively, the policymaker
might want to protect borrowers that are in a situation of fragility after a house
foreclosure by limiting the access of lenders to borrower’s income and other
assets. In that case, the policymaker prefers a non-recourse law, but what he
needs to acknowledge is that lenders will protect themselves by requiring higher
collateralization levels, which will reduce households’ access to the mortgage
market.
In the end, this study appeals to the idea that there ain’t no such thing as a
free lunch. So, if policy makers are considering changing the mortgage law, they
must be aware of its effects on the price and collateralization level of mortgages.
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Appendix A: Classification of states by mortgage law aspect
This appendix presents the current classification of states by mortgage law aspect,
as well as the changes from 2000 to 2016. The column Judicial describes the
foreclosure procedure classification, where Judicial = 1 represents mandatory
judicial foreclosures. The column NonRecourse describes the restrictions on
deficiency judgments, where NonRecourse = 1 means that deficiency judgments
are not allowed.
State Time Judicial NonRecourse
ALABAMA AL all 0 0
ALASKA AK all 0 1
ARIZONA AZ all 0 1
ARKANSAS AR all 0 0
CALIFORNIA CA all 0 1
COLORADO CO all 0 0
CONNECTICUT CT all 1 0
DELAWARE DE all 1 0
DIST. OF COLUMBIA DC up to 2010 0 0
DIST. OF COLUMBIA DC 2011 onward 1 0
FLORIDA FL all 1 0
GEORGIA GA all 0 0
HAWAII HI up to 2010 0 0
HAWAII HI 2011 onward 1 0
IDAHO ID all 0 0
ILLINOIS IL all 1 1
INDIANA IN all 1 0
IOWA IA all 0 1
KANSAS KS all 1 0
KENTUCKY KY all 1 0
LOUISIANA LA all 1 0
MAINE ME all 1 0
MARYLAND MD all 1 0
MASSACHUSETTS MA all 0 0
MICHIGAN MI all 0 0
MINNESOTA MN all 0 1
MISSISSIPPI MS all 0 0
MISSOURI MO all 0 0
MONTANA MT all 0 1
NEBRASKA NE all 0 0
NEVADA NV up to 2009 0 0
NEVADA NV 2010 onward 0 1
NEW HAMPSHIRE NH all 0 0
NEW JERSEY NJ all 1 0
NEW MEXICO NM all 1 0
NEW YORK NY all 1 0
NORTH CAROLINA NC all 0 1
NORTH DAKOTA ND all 1 1
Table A1. Mortgage law by state
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State Time Judicial NonRecourse
OHIO OH all 1 0
OKLAHOMA OK all 1 0
OREGON OR all 0 1
PENNSYLVANIA PA all 1 0
RHODE ISLAND RI all 0 0
SOUTH CAROLINA SC all 1 0
SOUTH DAKOTA SD all 1 0
TENNESSEE TN all 0 0
TEXAS TX all 0 1
UTAH UT all 0 0
VERMONT VT up to 2006 0 0
VERMONT VT 2007 onward 1 0
VIRGINIA VA all 0 0
WASHINGTON WA all 0 1
WEST VIRGINIA WV all 0 0
WISCONSIN WI all 1 1
WYOMING WY all 0 0






























Appendix B: Comparison of classification of states by mortgage law aspect
This appendix presents the comparison of classification of states by mortgage law aspect across different sources and studies, namely
Mian et al. (2015), Ghent and Kudlyak (2011), and RealtyTrac.com41. Table B1 shows the differences in the foreclosure procedure











DIST. OF COLUMBIA DC 0/1 0 0 0 The change in the judicial foreclosure requirement in the District of
Columbia started with the "Saving D.C. Homes from Foreclosures
Emergency Amendment Act of 2010" effective on November,17
2010. During the discussion period the majority of residential
foreclosure activity become judicial due to the risks involved. After
some changes, the Act became law on November 4, 2013.
HAWAI HI 0/1 0 0 0 With the "Act48" SLH 2011 of May, 5 2011, lenders where
discouraged to pursue nonjudicial foreclosures. Most foreclosures
become judicial.
MASSACHUSETTS MA 0 1 0 1 Foreclosures in Massachusetts require a two-stage procedure. First,
a judgment from the land court declaring that the mortgagors
are not under protection of the Service members Civil Relief Act
(SCRA). Second, a nonjudicial or judicial foreclosure depending on
the existence of a power of sale clause. I consider the first stage
as not significant for the classification of judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure, meaning that, following the criteria on the other states
I classify Massachusetts as a state that does not require judicial
foreclosure.
Table B1. Differences in the judicial foreclosure classification













NEBRASKA NE 0 1 0 1 Nebraska allows for nonjudicial foreclosures for a deed of trust, but
requires judicial foreclosure for mortgages. As in this paper I use a
broad definition of mortgage that includes the deeds of trust, and
following the criteria on the other states, I classify Nebraska as a
state that does not require judicial foreclosure.
OKLAHOMA OK 1 0 0 1 Oklahoma allows for nonjudicial foreclosures but are extremely
rare, due to certain restrictions. As most foreclosures are judicial, I
classify Oklahoma as a state that requires judicial foreclosure.
SOUTH DAKOTA SD 1 0 0 1 South Dakota allows for nonjudicial foreclosures but are frequently
not used, due to uncertainty in the foreclosure process. As most
foreclosures are judicial, I classify South Dakota as a state that
requires judicial foreclosure.
VERMONT VT 0/1 1 1 1 After 2006, nonjudicial foreclosures were discouraged in Vermont
due to a revision of the foreclosure statute. The 2006 foreclosure
stature establishes that nonjudicial foreclosures are only possible if
there is no equity in the subject property, which is burdensome
to prove. I classify Vermont as a state that does not require
judicial foreclosure up to 2006 and as a state that requires judicial
foreclosure from 2007 onward.
WISCONSIN WI 1 0 1 1 Although Wisconsin allows for nonjudicial foreclosures, most
foreclosures are judicial.




































ILLINOIS IL 1 0 Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) recognize that deficiency judgments are rarely granted, but
classify the state as recourse by arguing that the possibility of personal recourse may be
enough to deter strategic default. I do not follow their argument because the judicial
approval of the property sale frequently implies that the lender waves her right to a
deficiency judgment. If the sale is conditional on waving the deficiency judgments, then
the lender is not protected by personal recourse.
TEXAS TX 1 0 Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) recognize that the state law allows deficiency judgments, even
if the large homestead exemption may be an obstacle. I do not follow their argument
because besides the almost unlimited homestead exemption, deficiency judgments are
frequently noncollectable due to the fact that the borrower is "judgment proof".
Table B2. Differences in the non-recourse classification
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Appendix C: Orthogonality of mortgage law differences to social and
economic conditions
This appendix presents the results of the univariate regressions of a set of state
attributes on the mortgage law aspects. Table C1 shows if judicial states also
significantly differ in other economic and social attributes. Table C2 shows if non-
recourse states also significantly differ in other economic and social attributes.
Judicial N R2
Demographics and Income Variables
Fraction with 65 years or more, 2008-14 0.0106 * 47 0.108
(0.0043)
Fraction with less than high school, 2008-14 -0.0058 47 0.011
(0.0077)
Black fraction, 2008-14 0.0270 47 0.020
(0.0282)
Hispanic fraction, 2008-14 -0.0054 47 0.001
(0.2979)
Poverty fraction, 2008-14 -0.0005 47 0.000
(0.0090)
Fraction with personal income less than $25k, 2008-14 -0.0060 47 0.007
(0.1070)
Fraction with household income less than $25k, 2008-14 0.0039 47 0.002
(0.0120)
Fraction with income less than $25k, 2008-14 0.0029 47 0.001
(0.0119)
Unemployment rate, 2008-14 -0.0025 47 0.006
(0.0045)
Table C1. Orthogonality of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement
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Judicial N R2
GDP Variables
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2000 -0.0029 47 0.003
(0.0077)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2002 0.0042 47 0.011
(0.0068)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2004 -0.0008 47 0.001
(0.0050)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2006 -0.0021 47 0.002
(0.0065)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2008 0.0041 47 0.007
(0.0074)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2010 0.0050 47 0.013
(0.0065)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2012 0.0093 47 0.022
(0.0104)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2014 0.1039 47 0.089
(0.0052)
Real GDP per capita, 2000 1326 47 0.006
(2614)
Real GDP per capita, 2002 1850 47 0.012
(2581)
Real GDP per capita, 2004 1888 47 0.012
(2635)
Real GDP per capita, 2006 1367 47 0.005
(2808)
Real GDP per capita, 2008 1219 47 0.004
(2870)
Real GDP per capita, 2010 1916 47 0.009
(2909)
Real GDP per capita, 2012 2601 47 0.015
(3122)
Real GDP per capita, 2014 2748 47 0.018
(3048)
Real GDP per capita, 2016 1951 47 0.010
(2922)




House price growth, 2000 0.0046 47 0.003
(0.1251)
House price growth, 2002 0.0105 47 0.012
(0.0142)
House price growth, 2004 0.0101 47 0.006
(0.0200)
House price growth, 2006 -0.0070 47 0.005
(0.1329)
House price growth, 2008 0.0097 47 0.008
(0.0163)
House price growth, 2010 0.0089 47 0.019
(0.0095)
House price growth, 2012 -0.0277 ** 47 0.161
(0.0091)
House price growth, 2014 -0.1372 * 47 0.087
(0.0064)
House price growth, 2016 -0.1044 47 0.034
(0.0081)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2000 0.0578 47 0.024
(0.0521)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2002 0.0566 47 0.046
(0.0389)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2004 0.0184 47 0.002
(0.0576)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2006 0.0397 47 0.010
(0.0539)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2008 0.0474 47 0.013
(0.0622)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2010 0.0893 47 0.016
(0.1133)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2012 -0.2223 47 0.012
(0.3176)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2014 0.2395 47 0.019
(0.2948)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2016 -0.0561 47 0.010
(0.0813)
Table C1. Orthogonality of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement (cont.)
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Judicial N R2
Mortgage Market Variables
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2004 -3060 47 0.034
(2332)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2006 -3469 47 0.024
(30594)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2008 -4245 47 0.029
(35645)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2010 -3176 47 0.022
(3115)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2012 -2755 47 0.018
(2993)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2014 -2842 47 0.022
(2756)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2016 -2965 47 0.024
(2731)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42004 0.0020 47 0.031
(0.0017)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42006 0.0023 47 0.059
(0.0014)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42008 0.0044 47 0.013
(0.0063)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42010 0.0114 47 0.034
(0.0098)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42012 0.0186 * 47 0.140
(0.0077)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42014 0.0133 ** 47 0.213
(0.0043)
Mortgage delinquency rate, Q42016 0.0074 *** 47 0.304
(0.0018)
Table C1. Orthogonality of Judicial Foreclosure Requirement (cont.)
This tables presents coefficients of the univariate regression for xi variable on Judicial dummy.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and + are
statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
States subject to changes in the mortgage law not included in the regressions. Data sources:
Demographics and income variables from Current Population Survey (CPS), GDP variables from
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), house price growth from Zillow - (Single Family Residence),
manufactured housing shipping annual growth from Institute for Building Technology & Safety
(IBTS), and mortgage market variables from State Level Household Debt Statistics 2003-2017,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Non-recourse N R2
Demographics and Income Variables
Fraction with 65 years or more, 2008-14 -0.0104 + 47 0.085
(0.0055)
Fraction with less than high school, 2008-14 -0.0046 47 0.006
(0.0109)
Black fraction, 2008-14 -0.0613 * 47 0.083
(0.0243)
Hispanic fraction, 2008-14 0.0520 47 0.054
(0.0399)
Poverty fraction, 2008-14 -0.0047 47 0.005
(0.0095)
Fraction with personal income less than $25k, 2008-14 -0.0120 47 0.022
(0.0110)
Fraction with household income less than $25k, 2008-14 -0.0150 47 0.027
(0.1132)
Fraction with income less than $25k, 2008-14 -0.0082 47 0.008
(0.0111)
Unemployment rate, 2008-14 0.0019 47 0.003
(0.0055)
GDP Variables
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2000 0.0018 47 0.001
(0.0091)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2002 0.0031 47 0.005
(0.0057)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2004 0.0017 47 0.002
(0.0058)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2006 0.0087 47 0.029
(0.0066)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2008 -0.0006 47 0.000
(0.0084)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2010 -0.0007 47 0.000
(0.0077)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2012 0.0256 + 47 0.137
(0.0144)
Real GDP per capita annual growth, 2014 0.0042 47 0.012
(0.0061)
Table C2. Orthogonality of Non-recourse law
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Non-recourse N R2
GDP Variables (cont.)
Real GDP per capita, 2000 1266 47 0.005
(2575)
Real GDP per capita, 2002 1261 47 0.004
(2641)
Real GDP per capita, 2004 1468 47 0.006
(2529)
Real GDP per capita, 2006 2290 47 0.012
(2746)
Real GDP per capita, 2008 3064 47 0.020
(2886)
Real GDP per capita, 2010 3146 47 0.021
(3071)
Real GDP per capita, 2012 5392 47 0.054
(3536)
Real GDP per capita, 2014 5576 47 0.061
(3372)
Real GDP per capita, 2016 5206 47 0.056
(3047)
Housing Market Variables
House price growth, 2000 -0.0074 47 0.005
(0.0162)
House price growth, 2002 -0.0071 47 0.004
(0.0139)
House price growth, 2004 0.0106 47 0.005
(0.0213)
House price growth, 2006 -0.0018 47 0.000
(0.0139)
House price growth, 2008 -0.0135 47 0.012
(0.0214)
House price growth, 2010 -0.0065 47 0.008
(0.0121)
House price growth, 2012 0.0272 * 47 0.127
(0.0133)
House price growth, 2014 0.0104 47 0.041
(0.0071)
House price growth, 2016 0.0088 47 0.020
(0.0105)
Table C2. Orthogonality of Non-recourse law (cont.)
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Non-recourse N R2
Housing Market Variables (cont.)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2000 -0.0027 47 0.000
(0.0562)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2002 0.0067 47 0.001
(0.0355)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2004 -0.0742 47 0.030
(0.0553)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2006 0.0347 47 0.007
(0.0575)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2008 -0.0274 47 0.004
(0.0788)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2010 0.2103 47 0.072
(0.1582)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2012 0.2080 47 0.008
(0.3176)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2014 -0.2128 47 0.012
(0.1777)
Manufactured housing shipping annual growth, 2016 0.0543 47 0.008
(0.0863)
Mortgage Market Variables
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2004 2851 47 0.024
(2794)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2006 4234 47 0.030
(3886)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2008 5199 47 0.036
(4339)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2010 4249 47 0.032
(3583)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2012 3573 47 0.025
(3323)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2014 3887 47 0.034
(2958)
Mortgage debt balance per capita (excl. HELOC), 2016 4149 47 0.039
(2936)
Table C2. Orthogonality of Non-recourse law (cont.)
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Non-recourse N R2
Mortgage Market Variables (cont.)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42004 -0.0034 * 47 0.077
(0.0015)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42006 -0.0029 * 47 0.078
(0.0013)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42008 -0.0014 47 0.001
(0.0065)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42010 -0.0016 47 0.001
(0.0097)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42012 -0.0077 47 0.020
(0.0064)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42014 -0.0084 * 47 0.069
(0.0034)
Mortgage debt balance delinquency rate, Q42016 -0.0053 47 0.130
(0.0015)
Table C2. Orthogonality of Non-recourse law (cont.)
This tables presents coefficients of the univariate regression for xi variable on NonRecourse
dummy. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and +
are statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
States subject to changes in the mortgage law not included in the regressions. Data sources:
Demographics and income variables from Current Population Survey (CPS), GDP variables from
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), house price growth from Zillow - (Single Family Residence),
manufactured housing shipping annual growth from Institute for Building Technology & Safety
(IBTS), and mortgage market variables from State Level Household Debt Statistics 2003-2017,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Appendix D: Summary statistics by year
Year 2001 Year 2002
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Spread 63 40 -183 368 65 40 -304 496
Amount 149,984 61,564 50,000 578,000 157,388 67,663 50,000 650,000
Value 192,617 93,729 50,000 2,500,000 202,706 103,228 50,000 2,500,000
LTV 80.84 13.44 6 100 80.81 13.44 6 105
LTI 51.91 15.68 1.40 109.88 54.91 17.11 1.24 115.42
CreditScore 717 55 300 839 717 56 300 842
Income 3,218 2,386 480 212,338 3,266 3,284 474 200,256
DFirstTime 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.37 0.48 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Judicial 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
NonRecourse 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1
Observations 445,097 395,960
Year 2003 Year 2004
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Spread 61 42 -197 487 43 37 -192 457
Amount 166,905 73,920 50,000 749,000 169,673 76,714 50,000 642,000
Value 216,086 113,133 50,000 2,083,333 224,934 121,196 50,000 3,340,000
LTV 80.46 13.19 7 102 78.91 13.61 7 102
LTI 59.62 18.57 1.56 126.31 61.28 18.69 1.56 124.61
CreditScore 723 52 300 841 723 53 300 850
Income 3,149 2,560 434 230,512 3,069 2,219 429 264,417
DFirstTime 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Judicial 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
NonRecourse 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Observations 346,957 313,324
Year 2005 Year 2006
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Spread 81 39 -161 405 100 39 -160 381
Amount 178,777 83,738 50,000 800,000 186,532 92,168 50,000 802,000
Value 241,732 135,431 50,000 2,571,429 251,380 144,694 50,000 3,878,572
LTV 77.76 14.37 7 104 77.76 14.12 7 105
LTI 62.51 19.48 1.48 122.83 59.66 18.55 1.41 117.71
CreditScore 730 55 300 850 729 56 300 850
Income 3,183 2,292 431 219,423 3,467 2,490 456 182,283
DFirstTime 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Judicial 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
NonRecourse 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Observations 352,502 301,679
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Year 2007 Year 2008
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Spread 93 38 -212 429 119 49 -161 389
Amount 189,786 96,030 50,000 802,000 211,741 109,237 50,000 802,000
Value 248,262 147,835 50,000 3,207,692 281,890 180,192 50,000 4,369,231
LTV 80.11 14.62 6 103 79.39 14.57 8 105
LTI 59.81 18.96 1.45 122.69 61.62 19.87 1.54 126.31
CreditScore 728 57 300 850 741 50 333 850
Income 3,535 2,700 482 254,811 3,834 3,056 425 298,465
DFirstTime 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.45 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
Judicial 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.43 0.49 0 1
NonRecourse 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Observations 269,851 212,152
Year 2009 Year 2010
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Spread 136 46 -56 430 66 29 -73 304
Amount 218,730 123,981 50,000 1,403,000 218,706 124,904 50,000 1,129,000
Value 294,424 199,038 50,000 4,464,286 292,898 193,982 50,000 5,214,286
LTV 77.80 12.96 9 100 77.78 12.70 8 100
LTI 62.07 19.70 1.81 132.13 63.33 18.59 1.76 111.80
CreditScore 758 40 461 843 760 40 527 832
Income 3,908 3,012 413 220,680 3,777 2,843 461 249,622
DFirstTime 0.38 0.48 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0 1
Judicial 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.50 0 1
NonRecourse 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Observations 208,588 162,476
Year 2011
mean sd min max
Spread 64 34 -95 243
Amount 228,012 127,644 50,000 1,333,000
Value 298,860 193,853 50,000 3,037,500
LTV 79.47 12.69 10 100
LTI 64.87 18.27 1.81 127.77
CreditScore 760 39 562 835
Income 3,823 2,793 487 284,937
DFirstTime 0.37 0.48 0 1
DSingleBorrower 0.46 0.50 0 1
Judicial 0.44 0.50 0 1
NonRecourse 0.40 0.49 0 1
Observations 136,690
Table D1. Summary statistics by year from 2001 to 2011
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Appendix E: Distribution of residuals on the Spread regression
This appendix presents the residuals inspection for the estimation of Equation (1)















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.5964
Spread - OLS model - residuals distribution
Figure E1: Residuals distribution on the Spread regression
This figure presents the distribution of the residuals on the estimation of Equation (1) with year
and seller fixed effects. The estimated residuals (Kernel density estimate) follow a distribution close
to the assumption of normality distribution represented by the dash line.
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Appendix F: Robustness checks
This appendix presents the main estimation results for the robustness tests. Table
F1 shows the results for the alternative definition of Spread2. Table F2 shows
the results for the estimation on the combined loan-to-value ratio. Table F3 shows
the results when considering time dependency. Figure F1 shows the evolution of





































FE Year yes yes
FE Seller no yes
N 3,145,276 3,145,276
R2 0.338 0.344
Table F1. Effects of law on Spread2
This tables presents coefficients of the OLS regression for Spread2 on law dummies—Judicial
and NonRecourse. Standard errors are clustered by seller. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and


























FE Year yes yes
FE Seller no yes
N 3,145,276 3,145,276
R2 0.088 0.096
Table F2. Effects of law on CLTV
This tables presents coefficients of the OLS regression for CLTV on law dummies—Judicial and
NonRecourse. Standard errors are clustered by seller. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and +
are statistically different from zero at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
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Spread Spread LTV LTV
LogIncome -28.423∗∗ -27.714∗∗ 49.087∗∗∗ 49.316∗∗∗
(9.584) (9.038) (2.716) (2.706)
LogIncome2 1.109∗ 1.090∗ -3.066∗∗∗ -3.062∗∗∗
(0.539) (0.501) (0.165) (0.166)
LTI -0.288∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
CreditScore -0.133∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
DSingleBorrower 3.626∗∗∗ 3.551∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 2.014∗∗∗
(0.495) (0.476) (0.082) (0.075)
DFirstTime 1.711∗ 2.489∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 4.066∗∗∗
(0.691) (0.914) (0.225) (0.160)
2001xJudicial 6.461∗∗∗ 6.095∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.081
(0.454) (0.432) (0.310) (0.353)
2002xJudicial 3.284∗∗∗ 2.770∗∗∗ 0.189 -0.024
(0.589) (0.651) (0.240) (0.303)
2003xJudicial 5.037∗∗∗ 4.533∗∗∗ 0.433∗ 0.246
(0.601) (0.539) (0.171) (0.193)
2004xJudicial 5.949∗∗∗ 5.370∗∗∗ 0.498∗ 0.312
(0.527) (0.480) (0.241) (0.230)
2005xJudicial 4.971∗∗∗ 4.417∗∗∗ 0.566 0.389
(0.699) (0.607) (0.325) (0.247)
2006xJudicial 5.946∗∗∗ 5.564∗∗∗ 0.278 0.207
(0.696) (0.634) (0.305) (0.263)
2007xJudicial 5.697∗∗∗ 5.468∗∗∗ 0.195 0.129
(0.603) (0.613) (0.366) (0.318)
2008xJudicial 3.699∗∗∗ 3.599∗∗ 0.172 0.159
(0.999) (1.011) (0.370) (0.267)
2009xJudicial 3.798∗∗ 3.493∗∗ 0.359 0.211
(1.289) (1.095) (0.326) (0.215)
2010xJudicial 1.544∗ 1.071 0.536 0.441
(0.660) (0.808) (0.384) (0.345)
2011xJudicial 0.470 0.516 0.127 -0.013
(0.659) (0.931) (0.389) (0.393)
Table F3. Effects of law on Spread and LTV by Year
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Spread Spread LTV LTV
2001xNonRecourse 0.130 0.621 -0.331 + -0.193
(0.333) (0.373) (0.181) (0.195)
2002xNonRecourse -0.797 -0.397 -0.692∗∗∗ -0.491∗
(0.571) (0.602) (0.184) (0.213)
2003xNonRecourse -0.556 -0.125 -0.553∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗
(0.462) (0.483) (0.124) (0.133)
2004xNonRecourse -0.775∗ -0.414 -0.465∗∗∗ -0.326∗
(0.306) (0.367) (0.115) (0.120)
2005xNonRecourse -1.156∗ -0.707 -0.608∗∗ -0.452∗
(0.509) (0.587) (0.212) (0.218)
2006xNonRecourse 0.022 0.460 -0.672∗∗ -0.498∗
(0.400) (0.426) (0.227) (0.187)
2007xNonRecourse -0.690 -0.421 -0.784∗ -0.594∗
(0.786) (0.804) (0.306) (0.236)
2008xNonRecourse 0.556 0.245 -0.686∗ -0.535+
(0.825) (0.731) (0.301) (0.273)
2009xNonRecourse 2.130+ 2.008+ -0.668∗ -0.505
(1.093) (1.049) (0.279) (0.299)
2010xNonRecourse 1.358 1.279 -0.538+ -0.383
(0.931) (0.891) (0.288) (0.300)
2011xNonRecourse 1.529 1.383 -0.645∗ -0.554+
(1.073) (1.067) (0.297) (0.288)
FE Year yes yes yes yes
FE Seller no yes no yes
N 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276 3,145,276
R2 0.327 0.333 0.096 0.106
Table F3. Effects of law on Spread and LTV by Year (cont.)
This tables presents coefficients of the OLS regression for Spread and LTV on law dummies—
Judicial and NonRecourse—interacted with year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by
seller. Coefficients marked with ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ and + are statistically different from zero at the 0.1%,
1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.



















































































CaseShiller U.S. National Home Price Index Jan2000=100 (Nominal)
Figure F1: Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index
Note: This figure shows the evolution of the Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index data
available on ❤tt♣s✿✴✴❢r❡❞✳st❧♦✉✐s❢❡❞✳♦r❣. The shaded area emphasizes the years 2009, 2010
and 2011, for which the mortgage law have lower or no impact on the mortgage interest rate and
on the LTV ratio. It coincides with a depressed housing market where lenders might attribute a low
probability to the default scenario.
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